内容紹介

Algorithmic game theory is the study of interdisciplinary topics that lie in the intersection of computer science and microeconomics. In this talk, we introduce one subfield of algorithmic game theory, which is called automated mechanism design. Automated mechanism design studies how to use computational techniques to design economic mechanisms (rules for social decision problems). This talk does not assume any prior knowledge in game theory or mechanism design, as we will introduce all the basic concepts in the beginning of the talk. Besides the basic concepts, we will also focus on one main case study, as detailed below:We study the problem of allocating a single item repeatedly among multiple competing agents, in an environment where monetary transfers are not possible. We design (Bayes-Nash) incentive compatible mechanisms that do not rely on payments, with the goal of maximizing expected social welfare. We introduce an artificial payment system, which enables us to construct repeated allocation mechanisms without payments based on one-shot allocation mechanisms with payments. We evaluate mechanisms based on their competitive ratios. Our resulting mechanisms are proved to achieve very high competitive ratios, which implies that for repeated allocation, artificial payments may be used to replace real monetary payments, without incurring too much loss in social welfare.

詳細情報

刊年

2017

形態

電子化映像資料(1時間24分20秒)

シリーズ名

情報科学研究科・ゼミナール講演 ; 平成28年度

注記

講演者所属: University of Adelaide

講演日: 平成29年1月25日

講演場所: 情報科学研究科大講義室L1

標題言語

英語 (eng)

本文言語

英語 (eng)

著者情報

Guo, Mingyu